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Macroeconomics research has changed profoundly since the Kydland-Prescott sem-
inal paper. In order to address the Lucas Critique, modelling now is based on micro-
foundations treating agents as rational utility optimizers. Bayesian estimation has
produced models which are more data consistent than those based simply on calibra-
tion. With micro-foundations and new linear-quadratic techniques, normative policy
based on welfare analysis is now possible. In the open economy, policy involves a
‘game’ with policymakers and private institutions or private individuals as players.
This paper attempts to reassess the Kydland-Prescott contribution in the light of
these developments.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E37, E58
Keywords: Monetary rules, commitment, discretion, open economy, coordination
gains.
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I think she would have appreciated the keynote lecture and this paper.1 Introduction
Thirty years ago Kydland and Prescott (1977) introduced the ‘time-inconsistency’ problem
to the economics profession. In a nutshell, the problem they posed for policymakers is
that in a world of forward-looking rational agents, an optimal policy announced at time
t = 0 ceases to be optimal at every future point in time, t > 0. This creates an incentive to
re-optimize and renege on earlier policy commitments. The original commitment therefore
ceases to be credible. This feature holds even in the absence of uncertainty and even if
policymakers are completely benevolent. In other words, if policymakers succumb to the
temptation to renege, in a rational expectations world it will be anticipated and, at the
same time, can be completely in the interests of the public.
The ﬁrst thing to stress about time inconsistency is that it is a generic problem for
policy-makers in all areas. For example, for regulated utility services like telecommunica-
tions there is a classic time inconsistency problem referred to as the ‘hold-up problem’.
These services require large volumes of investment which, once installed become ‘sunk
assets’ in the sense that most or all of them cannot be removed and used elsewhere or sold
on second-hand markets at their original cost. In consequence, private investors are at
risk of opportunistic behaviour by regulators particularly over prices, once the investments
have been installed; and awareness by private investors of this regulatory risk drives up the
required rate of return and the cost of capital. The latter dramatically reduces investment
as has been seen in many countries.1
However the time-inconsistency problem is mostly associated with macroeconomic pol-
icy, and in particular, monetary policy. Following Barro and Gordon (1983) that built on
the ideas of Kyland and Prescott, a huge academic literature has grown that has been very
inﬂuential with policymakers. The central message underlying these contributions are the
existence of signiﬁcant macroeconomic gains, in some sense, from ‘enhancing credibility’
through formal commitment to a policy rule or through institutional arrangements for
central banks such as independence, transparency, and forward-looking inﬂation targets,
that achieve the same outcome.
In addressing these policy issues, until quite recently macroeconomics suﬀered from
two deﬁciencies: Keynesian models that featured real-world nominal rigidities, although
capable of accounting for stylized facts, lacked micro-foundations and were therefore vul-
nerable to the Lucas Critique. Non-Keynesian, neo-classical models such as the Lucas-
supply curve, which lie at the heart of the literature spawned by Barro-Gordon, can be
rigorously justiﬁed, but fail to account for the inﬂation persistence observed in the real-
1See Levine et al. (2005)
1world data, at least in the high inﬂation era in the 1970s and 1980s.2 The ‘New Keynesian’
(NK) models based on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models can now
claim to reconcile rigor and empirics.
The analysis of this paper uses a fairly standard NK model. Before proceeding it is
appropriate to acknowledge and try to address some criticisms of this this form of model
in the recent literature. There are essentially two strands to this critique both centred on
the pricing model of ‘Calvo contracts’. In order to capture inﬂation persistence NK models
introduce an ad hoc form of price indexing to past inﬂation. With the inclusion of output
persistence in the form of consumption habit, the resulting NK models have proved very
successful at generating observed patterns of inertia in inﬂation, output and the nominal
interest rate. Naturally on theoretical grounds, the introduction of such non-rational be-
haviour has been subjected to criticism.3. One response proposed by Collard and Dellas
(2006) is to return to the Lucas story of misperceptions about monetary aggregates, while
retaining the Calvo contract. This leads to a signal extraction problem which generates
inﬂation persistence without the inclusion of any indexation scheme. Looking more gen-
erally at realistic information assumptions is certainly a promising future agenda for the
DSGE literature. However there is a prior question: can data be reconciled with a NK
model using real persistence mechanisms arising from habit, but without price indexing?
We address this question in our Bayesian estimation below.
The second source of criticism of the NK models is their failure to match micro-
economic evidence on the frequency of price changes. 4 Two modiﬁcations to the Calvo
contract are found in the literature that addresses this issue. The ﬁrst allows state-
dependence in contracts; see for example, Gertler and Leahy (2004); the second introduces
sectoral heterogenity in price stickiness. Both these approaches have the convenient prop-
erty that the DSGE modeller can retain essentially the same form of NK Phillips curve,
but with an interpretation of the underlying contract length that can be reconciled with
the microeconomic evidence.
Returning to the earlier Barro-Gordon framework, in the essentially static model the
welfare loss associated with a lack of credibility takes the form of a long-run inﬂationary
bias. Whether this is a real problem or a non-problem (as argued by Blinder (1998)) is open
to question. For a dynamic models of the New Keynesian genre, such as that employed in
2However as Bordo and Filardo (2004), Minford (2006) and others have pointed out, inﬂation persistence
in the world’s major economies has declined in the current era of low inﬂation resulting in a signiﬁcant
improvement in the empirical performance of neo-classical models.
3Indeed, Minford and Peel (2004) argue that if price-setters adjust prices based on expected rather than
past inﬂation then this eliminates the NK Phillips curve all together!
4See Angeloni et al. (2006).
2this paper, the inﬂuential review of Clarida et al. (1999) emphasizes the stabilization gain
from commitment which exist whether or not there is a long-run inﬂationary bias. But
what is the size of this stabilization gain from commitment?
One contribution of this paper is to answer this question using a standard DSGE
model estimated by Bayesian methods. In doing so we address an important consideration,
namely the existence of a zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate. Using a simple
calibrated New Keynesian model, Adam and Billi (2007) show that ignoring this constraint
on the setting of the nominal interest rate can result in considerably underestimating
the stabilization gain from commitment. The reason for this is that under discretion the
monetary authority cannot make credible promises about future policy. For a given setting
of future interest rates, the volatility of inﬂation is driven up by the expectations of the
private sector that the monetary authority will re-optimize in the future. This means
that to achieve a given low volatility of inﬂation the lower bound is reached more often
under discretion than under commitment. In our set-up, following Woodford (2003), we
approximate the zero lower interest rate bound with a constraint on the variability of the
nominal interest rate. The central bank then chooses a positive long-run inﬂation target
so has to avoid hitting the lower bound with a probability close to unity. This results to
a form of “inﬂationary bias”, but one resulting from the lower interest rate bound and
not from the ineﬃciency of the natural rate of output. By contrast in Adam and Billi
(2007) the interest rate frequently falls into the liquidity trap resulting in expectations of
negative inﬂation and in a deﬂationary as opposed to our inﬂationary bias. The former
phenomenon, highlighted by Krugman (1998), is more applicable to countries such as
Japan that have fallen into a liquidity trap than to the current low inﬂation and moderate
interest rate environments witnessed in most countries.
The second contribution of this paper is to assess the credibility problem in an open
economy context where central banks can act strategically. DSGE modelling of open
economies has been a very active area in the last decade. Following from this literature
we have witnessed a new look at an old issue in monetary policy: what is the potential
gain from policy coordination and how can this be sustained? We provide an assessment
of these developments and show how the coordination problem is closely related to the
time-inconsistency problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out our New Keynesian
model with persistent mechanisms taking the form of habit formation in consumption
and labour supply and price indexing. A linearization of the model about a zero-interest
steady state and a quadratic approximation of the representative household’s utility sets
up the optimization problem facing the monetary authority in the required LQ framework.
3Section 3 uses Bayesian methods to estimate the model and variants where the indexing
of prices and the two forms of habit formation are suppressed in turn.
Our welfare quadratic approximation assumes that the zero-inﬂation steady state is
close to the social optimum (the ‘small distortions case’ of Woodford (2003)). In section 4
we therefore assess the quality of this approximation. In doing this we examine a relatively
neglected aspect of New Keynesian models that arises with the inclusion of external habit
in consumption, namely that the natural rate of output and employment can actually be
above the social optimum. The consequence of this is that for the purely deterministic
problem, the more familiar “inﬂationary bias” that occurs in the deterministic optimal
policy problem is negative and the tax wedge, up to a point, may be welfare-enhancing.
In section 5 we focus on the stochastic stabilization problem and address the question of
the size of the stabilization gain from commitment. Section 6 explores the open-economy
aspects of the time-inconsistency problem and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 A DSGE Model with Structural Dynamics
Our model is essentially the inﬂuential model of Smets and Wouters (2003), but without
physical capital and wage stickiness, but with a distortionary tax on income and habit
formation in labour supply. In a cashless economy, there is a risk-free nominal bond. A
ﬁnal homogeneous good is produced competitively using a CES technology consisting of a
continuum of diﬀerentiated goods. Intermediate goods producers and household suppliers
of labor have monopolistic power. Nominal prices of intermediate goods are sticky. The
novel feature of our model is that we incorporate habit formation in both consumption and
labour supply. There is Calvo price setting with indexing of prices for those ﬁrms who, in a
particular period, do not re-optimize their prices. Our model is stochastic with exogenous
AR(1) stochastic processes for total factor productivity in the intermediate goods sector
and government spending.
2.1 Households














where Et is the expectations operator indicating expectations formed at time t and β is
the household’s discount factor, Ct(r) is an index of consumption, Nt(r) are hours worked,
HC,t and HN,t represents the habit, or desire not to diﬀer too much from other households,
and we choose HC,t = hCCt−1, where Ct = 1
ν
Pν
r=1 Ct(r) is the average consumption
4index, HN,t = hN
Nt−1
ν , where Nt is aggregate labour supply deﬁned after (3) below and
hC,hN ∈ [0,1). When hC = 0, σ > 1 is the risk aversion parameter (or the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution). u(Gt) is the utility from exogenous real
government spending Gt. We normalize the household number ν at unity.
The representative household r must obey a budget constraint:
PtCt(r) + Dt(r) = Wt(r)(1 − Tt)Nt(r) + (1 + it−1)Dt−1(r) + Γt(r) (2)
where Pt is a price index, Dt(r) are end-of-period holdings of riskless nominal bonds with
nominal interest rate it over the interval [t,t + 1]. Wt(r) is the wage, Γt(r) are dividends
from ownership of ﬁrms net of any lump-sum taxes and Tt is a tax on labour income.5 In
addition, if we assume that households’ labour supply is diﬀerentiated with elasticity of











1−η is an average wage index and Nt is average employment.
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (3) and imposing symmetry on households (so that
Ct(r) = Ct, etc) yields standard results:















(Nt − HN,t)φ(Ct − HC,t)σ (5)
(4) is the familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule adapted to take into account of the consumption
habit. (5) equates the real post tax wage with the marginal rate of substitution between
work and consumption, marked up to reﬂect the market power of households arising from
their monopolistic supply of a diﬀerentiated factor input with elasticity η.
2.2 Firms
Competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrms use a continuum of non-traded intermediate goods according







where ζ is the elasticity of substitution. This implies a set of demand equations for each












1−ζ. Pt is an aggregate intermediate price index, but since
ﬁnal goods ﬁrms are competitive and the only inputs are intermediate goods, it is also the
domestic price level.
In the intermediate goods sector each good m is produced by a single ﬁrm m using







where Nt(r,m) is the labour input of type r by ﬁrm m and At is an exogenous shock
capturing shifts to trend total factor productivity (TFP) in this sector. Minimizing costs
R 1
0 Wt(r)Nt(r,m)dr and aggregating over ﬁrms and denoting
R 1
0 Nt(r,m)dm = Nt(r) leads








dm is price dispersion that leads to a cost of inﬂation.
For later analysis it is useful to deﬁne the real marginal cost as the wage relative to









φ (Ct − HC,t)σ (9)
Now we assume that there is a probability of 1 − ξ at each period that the price of
each intermediate good m is set optimally to P0
t (m). If the price is not re-optimized,
then it is indexed to last period’s aggregate producer price inﬂation.6 With indexation














,... . For each intermediate producer m the
objective is at time t to choose {P0

















given it (since ﬁrms are atomistic), subject to (7), where Qt+k is the discount factor over





























+ (1 − ξ)(P0
t+1)1−ζ (12)
6Thus we can interpret
1
1−ξ as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged.
62.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, goods markets, money markets and the bond market all clear. Equating




= Ct + Gt (13)
Assuming the same tax rate levied on all income (wage income plus dividends) a balanced
budget government budget constraint
PtGt = PtTtYt (14)
completes the model. As in Coenen et al. (2005) we further assume that changes in
government spending are ﬁnanced exclusively by changes in lump-sum taxes with the
tax rate Tt held constant at its steady-state value. Given interest rates it, expressed
later either in terms of an optimal or an Inﬂation Forecast-Based (IFB) rule, the money
supply is ﬁxed by the central banks to accommodate money demand. By Walras’ Law we
can dispense with the bond market equilibrium condition and therefore the government
budget constraint that determines taxes τt. Then the equilibrium is deﬁned at t = 0 by
stochastic processes Ct, Dt, Pt, Wt, Yt, Nt, given past price indices and exogenous TFP
and government spending processes.
2.4 Zero-Inﬂation Steady State
A deterministic zero-inﬂation steady state, denoted by variables without the time sub-








1 = β(1 + i) (16)
Y = AN (17)












giving us in eﬀect 7 equations to determine W
P , i, C, N, Y , P
P 0 and T. The natural rate
of interest is determined by the private sector’s discount factor. In our cashless economy
the price level is indeterminate.
73 Bayesian Estimation
In this section we conduct a Bayesian estimation of the linearized form, about the steady
state, of the model as in Batini et al. (2006). We estimate the following model variants:
Model 1: hC = hN = 0, γ > 0
Model 2: hC > 0, hN = γ = 0
Model 3: hC = 0, hN > 0, γ = 0
Model 4: hC = 0, hN = 0, γ > 0
Model 5: hC > 0, hN > 0, γ = 0
Model 6: hC > 0, hN = 0, γ > 0
Model 7: hC = 0, hN > 0, γ > 0
Model 8: hC > 0, hN > 0, γ > 0
Three observables in the estimated model variants are output, annualized inﬂation and
annualized Fed Funds rate series for the US. Since the variables in the model are mea-
sured as deviations from a constant steady state, the data is simply de-trended against
a linear trend. The estimation results are based on a sample from 1983:1 to 2002:4 and
8 observations are used to initialize the Kalman ﬁlter. Moreover, two of the structural
parameters can be related to the steady state values of the observed variables in the model,
and are therefore calibrated so as to match the sample mean of these. The discount factor
β is set to 0.99, which implies an annual steady state nominal interest rate of 4 percent.
A common theme in papers estimating DSGE models is the diﬃculty in pinning down
the parameter of labour supply elasticity φ, inference on the inverse Frisch elasticity of
labour supply has been found susceptible to model speciﬁcations, and exhibiting wide
posterior probability intervals.(Batini et al. (2006)) As a result, following Christiano et al.
(2005), the parameter φ is set to unity. They also argue that although this calibrated
elasticity is low by comparison with the values assumed in the real business cycle lit-
erature, it is well within the range of point estimates reported in the labour literature.
(See, for instance, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)) For the remainder of parameters, as
suggested by Castillo et al. (2006), inverse gamma distributions are used as priors when
non-negativity constraints are necessary, and beta distributions for fractions or probabil-
ities. Normal distributions are used when more informative priors seem to be necessary.
The prior means and distributions of these parameters can be found in Table 2.
All analysis is performed with the DYNARE (Matlab version) programme (Juillard
(2006))7 and Matlab. The IFB policy rule contained in the models is the one-quarter ahead
7Version 3.064 of the package is available for downloading from the Dynare homepage:
http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/juillard/mambo/index.php
8forward-looking rule8 and we include estimation of the interest rate smoothing parameter.
In deviation form this is given by
it = ρiit−1 + (1 − ρi)θEtπt+1 (21)
In order to avoid a stochastic singularity when evaluating the likelihood function,
Dynare requires at least as many shocks or measurement errors in the models as observable
variables (i.e. requires that the covariance matrix of endogenous variables is nonsingular).
In this estimation an additional structural shock is included to capture, to some extent,
aggregation eﬀects (e.g. monetary policy shock) and measurement errors in the data.
The mode of the posterior is ﬁrst estimated using the MATLAB’s fmincon (and Chris
Sim’s csminwel9) after the models’ log-prior densities and log-likelihood functions have
been obtained by running the Kalman recursion and maximized. Then a sample from the
posterior distribution is obtained with the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm using the
inverse Hessian at the estimated posterior mode as the covariance matrix of the jumping
distribution. The covariance matrix needs to be adjusted in order to obtain reasonable
acceptance rates. Thus the scale used for the jumping distribution in the MH is set to
0.25, allowing good acceptance rates (around 40%-60%). Two parallel Markov chains of
100000 runs each are run from the posterior kernel for the MH. The ﬁrst 25% of iterations
(initial burn-in period) are discarded in order to remove any dependence of the chain from
its starting values. The estimation results then report the Bayesian inference. (Tables 2, 3
in Appendix B summarize the prior distributions, posterior means and medians and 90%
conﬁdence intervals for the eight model speciﬁcations). The posterior median is calculated
by sorting the draws from the marginal distribution of the parameters and computing the
value of the median after the MCMC is ﬁnished. The marginal data density of each model
is computed using the Geweke (1999) modiﬁed harmonic-mean estimator.
As shown in Table 3 in the Appendix B, estimates of the policy coeﬃcients are fairly
robust across speciﬁcations. As expected, the policy rule estimates imply a fairly strong
response (θ) to expected inﬂation by the US Fed Reserve and the degree of interest rate
smoothing (ρi) is substantial. All shocks from all the model variants are found fairly
persistent and volatile except that the technology shock seems to be less persistent in the
models without any habit formation (i.e. Models 1, 3, 4 and 7). As usual, monetary policy
disturbances (ǫe) are less important in driving inﬂation, consumption and output. As also
discussed in Batini et al. (2006), the estimates of γ imply that inﬂation is intrinsically
not very persistent in the relevant model speciﬁcations. The estimated mean and median
8Our estimates are, in fact, insensitive to the inclusion of an output gap term in the rule or to assuming
a current rather than forward-looking inﬂation feedback.
9See, for more details, Chris Sim’s homepage: http://www.princeton.edu/ sims/
9values of around 0.995 for the stochastic discount factors are very close to the conven-
tional calibrated value of β. On the demand side, it is found that both habit formations,
especially consumption habit, seem to play an important role in the US economy. In ad-
dition, the risk-aversion parameter (σ) is very small when consumption habit is absent,
indicating that the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (proportional to 1/σ) may be
quite large for Models 1, 3, 4 and 7. For Models 6 and 8 , the larger value of the slope
of the Phillips curve (λ) corresponds to a smaller ξ which indicates that nominal rigidity
and inertia in the price settings seems to be reduced. The median estimates for the real
interest rate i∗ translate into a median value of around 0.995 for the stochastic discount
factor which, in turn, implies plausible estimates for the degree of price stickiness based
on the inferred values for the Phillips curve slope λ. Finally, the mean/median estimates
of β,γ,λ determine the point estimates for the degree of price stickiness ξ, which is then
found to be fairly strong and in accordance with the values estimated by Blinder et al.
(1998) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998). In particular, ξ ranges from 0.41 up to 0.71 ,
corresponding to contract lengths, 3.14, 2.80, 3.45, 2.54, 3.23, 1.69, 2.66 and 1.87 quarters
for Models 1-8, respectively, which seem to be close to the plausible estimates. 10
The problem of Bayesian model comparisons is to use data to determine which of the
eight competing models is closer to the ’truth’. We compare the posterior model probabili-
ties given data, P(M/D), which is given by Bayes’ theorem: P(M/D) = P(D/M)P(M)/P(D).
The key data-dependent term P(D/M) is the marginal data density, which is produced
by running DYNARE. Given that the prior probability of each model is assigned equal









and is normalized to P(Mj/D)/
P
i P(Mi/D) This is the bottom line of Table 2 which
indicates that Model 2 (with consumption habit but no labour habit or price indexation)
outperforms its 7 rivals. In the policy analysis of Section 5 we have therefore used the
median parameter estimates of Model 2. However the performance when including labour
habit persistence in improving model ﬁt appears ambiguous to interpret. On the other
hand, the second most restrictive model (Model 4, with only price indexation) seems to
be worst supported by the data. These results clearly suggest that incorporating habit
persistence in consumption in the US model imparts greater inertia to the model, and
improves the ﬁt.
Finally, in the introduction we asked whether can data be reconciled with a NK model
without the controversial inclusion of price indexing. Our three model variants without
10ξ is obtained by using λ ≡
(1−βξ)(1−ξ)
(1+βγ)ξ ; average contract length
1
1−ξ is measured in quarters.
10price indexing, models 2, 3 and 5 have a combined probability of 0.63, suggesting that the
answer to the question is in the aﬃrmative. The habit persistence mechanism is suﬃcient
on its own to impart both output and inﬂation inertia that enables our NK model to
achieve a good ﬁt with the data.
4 The Inﬂation Bias and Optimal Taxation
The natural rate of output is below the eﬃcient rate because of monopoly power in output
and labour markets, and external habit in labour supply. However, external habit in
consumption works in the opposite direction. To see this we solve for the deterministic
social planner’s problem.11 Using (1) the social planner chooses trajectories for output













where Ct = Yt − Gt and Nt = Yt




















The eﬃcient steady-state level of output Yt+1 = Yt = Yt−1 = Y ∗, say, is therefore given by
(Y ∗)φ(Y ∗ − G)σ =
(1 − hCβ)A1+φ
κ(1 − hNβ)(1 − hC)σ(1 − hN)φ (25)
From (15) to (19), after some manipulation, the steady-state level of output (the
‘natural rate’), is given by










κ(1 − hC)σ(1 − hN)φ (26)
Comparing (26) and (25), since (Y )φ(Y − G)σ is an increasing function of Y , we arrive
at12
Proposition















11Note that zero inﬂation with no welfare costs from the dispersion of labour demand across ﬁrms is
socially optimal.
12See Choudhary and Levine (2006).
11In the case where there is no habit persistence for both consumption and labour eﬀort,
hC = hN = 0, then (27) always holds. In this case tax distortions and market power in the
output and labour markets captured by the elasticities η,ζ ∈ (1,∞) drive the natural rate
of output below the eﬃcient level. If T = 0 and η = ζ = ∞, tax distortions and market
power disappear and the natural rate is eﬃcient. Another case when (27) always holds is
where habit persistence for labour supply exceeds that for consumption; i.e., hN ≥ hC.
Our empirical estimates strongly suggest that hC > hN which leads to the possibility
that the natural rate of output can actually be above the eﬃcient level. To pursue this
possibility there are two remaining parameters η and ζ to calibrate.13 The mark-up of the
real wage disposable wage on the marginal rate of substitution and the mark-up of the






respectively. Suppose we set these
mark-ups as equal and deﬁned by   as one or other of 1.10, 1.15, 1.20 and 1.30. Then the
optimal tax wedge that will equate the natural rate and socially optimal output levels in
the steady state is given by
T∗ = T∗( ) = 1 −
(1 − hCβ) 2
(1 − hNβ)
(28)
From Table 3, our favoured Model 2 with estimated probability 0.351 and median
values hC = 0.86, hN = 0, yields values T∗ = 0.82, 0.80, 0.79 and 0.75. These are very
large tax wedges, much higher than those in the US and the Euro Area.14However our
second ranking model, Model 5 with hC = 0.86 and hN = 0.67 gives that T∗ = 0.47, 0.42,
0.36 and 0.25. Moreover for our model variants 1, 3, 4 and 7 where hC = 0 we have that
T∗ < 0, implying a subsidy to producers is required to reach the social optimum. We can
use the estimated model probabilities to calculate the average tax wedge across all eight
models and these are reported in the last row of Table 3 for each value of  . Our conclusion
is that given our estimates for for all models are the associated model probabilities, from
a welfare perspective, the tax wedge is ‘corrective’ (in the words of Layard (2006)), rather
than distortionary, and that the existing wedge in the US may actually be too low, though
with an average optimal wedge in the region T∗ ∈ [0.49,0.64] the Euro Area tax wedge is
too high. The further implication is that the natural rate of output may be above the social
optimum, so if we are to accept the Barro-Gordon argument, the inﬂationary bias may
negative also. In view of these ﬁndings and the ‘Blinder Critique’ (Blinder (1998)) of the
inﬂation bias,15 in what follows we focus solely on the stabilization gain from commitment.
13An examination of the linearized form of the models reveals that η and ζ are not identiﬁed.
14Coenen et al. (2005) report total tax wedges of 37.3% and 64.1% respectively for the US and the Euro
Area.
15He argues that central banks can just “do it” and are able to commit to low average inﬂation, thus
125 Optimal Monetary Policy
5.1 The Stabilization Bias in General DSGE Models
The stabilization bias arose in our simple DSGE model by replacing a Phillips Curve
based on one-period ahead price contracts with one based on Staggered Calvo-type price
setting. The more developed DSGE model presented above added structural dynamics to

















where zt is a (n − m) × 1 vector of predetermined variables at time t with z0 given, xt,
is a m × 1 vector of non-predetermined variables and ot is a vector of outputs. A, B,
C and E are ﬁxed matrices and ǫt is a vector of random zero-mean shocks. Rational
expectations are formed assuming an information set {zs,xs,ǫs}, s ≤ t, the model and
the monetary rule. zt consists of exogenous shocks, and lagged variables; xt consists of
current inﬂation and consumption. xt also includes ﬂexi-price outcomes for the latter two
variables, and outputs ot consist of marginal costs, the marginal rate of substitution for
consumption and leisure, labour supply, output, ﬂexi-price outcomes, the output gap and
other target variables for the monetary authority. Let st = M[zT
t xT
t ]T be the vector of such
target variables. For the welfare-based loss function discussed below, the inter-temporal









where the single-period loss function is given by Lt = sT
t Q1st = yT
t Qyt where yt = [zT
t xT
t ]T
and Q = MTQ1M.
5.2 Imposing a Lower Interest Rate Bound Constraint
In the absence of a zero lower bound (henceforth ZLB) constraint on the nominal inter-
est rate the policymaker’s optimization problem is to minimize (31) subject to (29) and
(30). Then complete stabilization of the output gap and inﬂation is possible, but if shock
variances are suﬃciently large this will lead to a large variability of the nominal interest
rate and the possibility of it becoming negative. To rule out this possibility and to remain
eliminating the inﬂationary bias.
13within the convenient LQ framework of this paper, we follow Woodford (2003), chapter 6,



























Woodford shows that the eﬀect of these extra constraints is to follow the same optimization
as before except that the single period loss function is replaced with
Lt = yT
t Qyt + wi(it − i∗)2 (34)
where wi > 0 if (33) binds (which we assume) and i∗ > 0 if monetary transactions frictions
are negligible, but i∗ < 0 is possible otherwise (i.e., the interest rate must be lower than
that necessary to keep inﬂation zero in the steady state). In what follows we put i∗ = 0.
This approach to the ZLB constraint in eﬀect replaces it with a nominal interest rate
variability constraint which ensures the ZLB is hardly ever hit. By contrast the work of
a number of authors including Adam and Billi (2006, 2007), Coenen and Wieland (2003),
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson (2006) study optimal monetary policy
with commitment in the face of a non-linear constraint it ≥ 0 which allows for frequent
episodes of liquidity traps in the form of it = 0. Of these, Adam and Billi (2007) is
the only one to also study discretion and to address the issue of stabilization gains from
commitment, but only for the simplest possible New Keynesian model. The application of
their numerical methods to models with higher order dynamics, such as the one we study
in this paper, would fall foul of the “curse of dimensionality” (Judd (1998), chapter 7),
which our LQ framework avoids. Moreover we are not so much studying monetary policy
when faced with a liquidity trap, but rather the design of optimal rules that avoid excess
volatility of the nominal interest rate that takes us into the trap in the ﬁrst place. We
return to this point later when we discuss our results.
5.3 Commitment Versus Discretion
To derive the ex ante optimal policy with commitment following Currie and Levine (1993)








t Qyt + wii2




with respect to {it}, {yt} and the row vector of costate variables, pt, given z0. From
Appendix A of Levine et al. (2007b) where more details are provided, this leads to a
























is partitioned so that p1t, the co-state vector associated with the predetermined
variables, is of dimension (n − m) and p2t, the co-state vector associated with the non-
predetermined variables, is of dimension m. The loss function is given by
ΩOP













where Zt = ztzT
















and S is the solution to the steady-state Ricatti equation. In (39) matrices S and N
are partitioned conformably with yt = [zT
t xT
t ]T so that S11 for instance has dimensions
(n − m) × (n − m).
Note that in order to achieve optimality the policy-maker sets p20 = 0 at time t = 0. At
time t > 0 there exists a gain from reneging by resetting p2t = 0. It can be shown that N22
is negative deﬁnite, so the incentive to renege exists at all points along the trajectory of
the optimal policy. This essentially is the time-inconsistency problem facing stabilization
policy in a model with structural dynamics. The optimal rule (36) can be shown to consist
of a feedback on the lagged predetermined variables with geometrically declining weights
with lags extending back to time t = 0, the time of the formulation and announcement
of the policy (see Levine et al. (2007b)); in other words it is a rule with memory. The
discretionary (time-consistent) policy essentially eliminates the memory element, and with
it the incentive to renege along the equilibrium path, by posing a memoryless rule.
Technically, to evaluate the discretionary optimal policy we write the expected loss Ωt








= (1 − β)(yT
t Qyt + wii2
t) + βΩt+1 (40)
16Optimality from a ‘timeless perspective’ imposes a diﬀerent condition at time t = 0 (see Appendix
A.1.2 of Levine et al. (2007b)), but this has no bearing on the stochastic component of policy, the focus of
this paper.
15The dynamic programming solution then seeks a stationary solution of the form it = −Fzt,
Ωt = zTSz and x = −Nz where matrices S and N (completely unrelated to those deﬁned
for the commitment case) are now of dimension (n − m) × (n − m) and m × (n − m)
respectively, in which Ωt is minimized at time t subject to (1) in the knowledge that a
similar procedure will be used to minimize Ωt+1 at time t+1.17 Both the instrument it and
the forward-looking variables xt are now proportional to the predetermined component of
the state-vector zt and the equilibrium we seek is therefore Markov Perfect. We can set
this out as an iterative process for Ft, Nt, and St starting with some initial values. If the
process converges to stationary values independent of these initial values,18 F, N and S
say, then the time-consistent feedback rule is it = −Fzt with loss at time t given by
ΩTC










5.4 Formulating the Policymaker’s Loss Function
Although much of the optimal monetary policy literature has stayed with the ad hoc loss
function that penalizes variances of the output gap and the inﬂation rate, a normative
assessment of policy rules requires welfare analysis. For this, given our linear-quadratic
framework,19 we require a quadratic approximation of the representative consumer’s utility
function. A common procedure for reducing optimal policy to a LQ problem is as follows.
Linearize the model about a deterministic zero-inﬂation steady state as we have already
done. Then expand the consumer’s utility function as a second-order Taylor series after
imposing the economy’s resource constraint. In general this procedure is incorrect unless
the steady state is not too far from the eﬃcient outcome (see Woodford (2003), chapter 6,
Benigno and Woodford (2004), Kim and Kim (2006) and Levine et al. (2007a)). This is
the ‘small distortions’ case in this literature. The analysis of section 4 suggests that with
habit compensating for the negative distortions from market power and the tax wedge, the
distortions are indeed small. In what follows we assume this, and for this case we show in
Levine et al. (2007b) that a quadratic single-period loss function that approximates the
17See Currie and Levine (1993) and S¨ oderlind (1999).
18Indeed we ﬁnd this is the case in the results reported in the paper.
19We have emphasized the convenience of the LQ approach to optimal policy. However, recent develop-
ments in numerical methods now allow the researcher to go beyond linear approximations of their models
and to conduct analysis of both the dynamics and welfare under commitment using higher-order (usually
second-order) approximations (see, Kim et al. (2003) and for an application to simple monetary policy
rules, Juillard et al. (2004)). However for medium-large scale non-linear models, numerical computation
of optimal policy with an interest rate ZLB and/or discretion faces the “Curse of Dimensionality” alluded
to in section 5.2.
16utility takes the form
L = wc(ct − hCct−1)2 + wl(lt − hNlt−1)2 + wπ(πt − γπt−1)2 + walatlt (42)
where positive weights wc etc are deﬁned as follows:





(1 − ξ)(1 − βξ)
; wal = −2 (43)
where cy is the steady state ratio C/Y . All variables are in log-deviation form about the
steady state as in the linearization.20
5.5 Results
From our discussion of the interest rate ZLB eﬀect in section 5.2, the policymaker’s op-
timization problem is to choose an unconditional distribution for it (characterized by the
steady state variance) shifted to the right about a new non-zero steady state inﬂation
rate and a higher nominal interest rate, such that the probability, p, of the interest rate
hitting the lower bound is very low. This is implemented by calibrating the weight wi for
each of our policy rules so that z0(p)σi < i where z0(p) is the critical value of a standard
normally distributed variable Z such that prob (Z ≤ z0) = p, i = 1
β −1+π∗ is the steady
state nominal interest rate, σi is the unconditional variance and π∗ is the new steady state
inﬂation rate. Given σi the steady state positive inﬂation rate that will ensure it ≥ 0 with












In our linear-quadratic framework we can write the intertemporal expected welfare loss
at time t = 0 as the sum of stochastic and deterministic components, Ω0 = ˜ Ω0 + ¯ Ω0.
By increasing wi we can lower σi thereby decreasing π∗ and reducing the deterministic
component, but at the expense of increasing the stochastic component of the welfare loss.
20When there is no habit (hC = hN = 0) or government spending (cy = 1), ct = yt = lt −at and we end









(σ + φ)(yt − ˆ yt)
2 + wπ(πt − γπt−1)
2￿
#
where ˆ yt =
1+φ
σ+φat is potential output achieved when prices are ﬂexible. In this special case only, our the
micro-founded welfare-based loss function is then of exactly the same form as the commonly used ad hoc
formulation, give or take terms independent of policy.
21If the ineﬃciency of the steady-state output is negligible, then π
∗ ≥ 0 is a credible new steady state
inﬂation rate. Note that in our LQ framework when zero inﬂation is occasionally hit the interest rate is
allowed to become negative, possibly using a scheme proposed by Gesell (1934) and Keynes (1936).
17By exploiting this trade-oﬀ, we then arrive at the optimal policy that, in the vicinity of
the steady state, imposes the ZLB constraint, it ≥ 0 with probability 1 − p.
Table 5 shows the results of this optimization procedure under commitment using the
loss function given by (42) and based on parameter estimates for our favoured model 2.
We choose p = 0.025. Given wi, denote the expected inter-temporal loss (stochastic plus
deterministic components) at time t = 0 by Ω0(wi). This includes a term penalizing the
variance of the interest rate which does not contribute to utility loss as such, but rather
represents the interest rate lower bound constraint. Actual utility, found by subtracting
the interest rate term, is given by Ω0(0). The steady state inﬂation rate, π∗, that will
ensure the lower bound is reached only with probability p = 0.025 is computed using (44).
Given π∗, we can then evaluate the deterministic component of the welfare loss, ¯ Ω0. Since
in the new steady state the real interest rate is unchanged, the steady state involving real
variables is also unchanged, so from (42) we can write22
¯ Ω0(0) = wπ(1 − γ)2π∗2 (45)
Table 5 demonstrates the crucial role of the ZLB interest rate constraint in that it
results in a trade-oﬀ between reducing the stochastic component of policy at the expense
of a higher steady state inﬂation rate and, therefore, a higher deterministic component of
policy. In the absence of the ZLB constraint, the policymaker would not need to penalize
the variability of it and would optimize with wi = 0, achieving the minimum stochastic
welfare loss of ˜ Ω0(0) = 10.4 and a zero-inﬂation rate steady state. But this policy results
in an unconditional steady state variance of the interest rate of σ2
i = 1.57 with a resulting
high probability of hitting the ZLB. To reduce this probability to 2.5%, optimal policy
with wi = 0 must guide the economy to a non-zero inﬂation steady state of π∗ = 1.46%
per quarter with a corresponding large non-zero deterministic welfare loss. As the weight
wi increases, the steady state inﬂation rate falls at the expense of a higher stochastic
component of the welfare until at wi = 7, highlighted in bold, we reach the optimal choice
of wi that satisﬁes the ZLB constraint that a zero interest rate is reached with probability
2.5%.
Table 6 performs a similar exercise for optimal discretionary policy. Note that with
wi = 0, the unconditional variance, σ2
i , under discretion is lower than that under commit-
ment. To achieve the ZLB constraint then requires a larger steady state inﬂation under
22Both the ex-ante optimal and the optimal time-consistent deterministic welfare loss that guide the
economy from a zero-inﬂation steady state to π = π
∗ diﬀer from ¯ Ω0(0) (but not by much because the
steady state contributes by far outweighs the transitional contribution). From a timeless perspective (see
Woodford (2003), however, the policymaker will jump immediately to the new steady state justifying the
use of (45).
18commitment than under discretion and as a result the total welfare loss is actually higher.
However whereas under commitment the trade-oﬀ between a high steady-state inﬂation
rate and a smaller stochastic welfare loss can be exploited to drastically reduce the ul-
timate loss, this is not the case under discretion and highlights an important diﬀerence
between stabilization policy under commitment and discretion. For the latter we see that
the steady-state inﬂation – stochastic welfare loss trade-oﬀ now vanishes.23 As the weight
on interest rate variability, wi, increases, both the unconditional variance of the inter-
est rate, and the steady-state inﬂation rate needed to reduce the probability of hitting
the ZLB to 2.5% increase, with the consequence that wi = 0 is now optimal. This is a
somewhat counterintuitive result that can be explained in general by the fact that under
discretion, a policymaker lacks the leverage to manage the economy she would enjoy un-
der commitment. More speciﬁcally, the constraint on using the interest rate, captured by
increasing the weight wi, simply results in a more volatile economy and, in equilibrium,
both the variance of the inﬂation rate and that of the interest rate increase.
Now we can now assess the stabilization gains from commitment. Denote the expected
inter-temporal utility loss at time t = 0 under the time-consistent discretionary policy
and optimal commitment by ΩD
0 (0) and ΩC
0 (0) respectively. We compute these gains as





respectively. From Appendix C of Levine et al. (2007b), these are given by
ce =
ΩD
0 (0) − ΩC
0 (0)
1 − hC
× 10−2 ; πe =
s
2(ΩD




In (46) in the absence of a ZLB constraint, we take ΩC
0 (0) = ˜ ΩC
0 (0) = 10.4 and ΩD
0 (0) =
˜ ΩD
0 (0) = 11.0 from the ﬁrst rows of tables 4 and 5 respectively. With a ZLB constraint
we take ΩC
0 (0) = 11.87 from the wi = 7 row of Table 5 and ΩD
0 (0) = 27.4 from the wi = 0
row of Table 6.
Using these results Table 7 summarizes the gains from commitment measured by (46)
with and without interest rate ZLB considerations. In the latter case these gains are very
small – of the order of a 0.04% consumption equivalent gain. It is of interest to note here
that this is close to the gains from stabilization per reported by Lucas (1987). In our
model these gains can be found from the minimum welfare costs under commitment. Cor-
responding to (46) these are
ΩC
0 (0)
1−hC which from our results amounts to a 0.8% consumption
equivalent increase.24
23It should be stressed that this is a model-speciﬁc result. In Levine et al. (2007b), in a model with
capital the trade-oﬀ seen under commitment re-emerges.
24This ﬁgure are of the order of those reported in Levin et al. (2006) for a similar model but without
nominal interest rate lower bound. The reason why they are much larger in these models is down to the
19Introducing the nominal interest rate ZLB constraint sees these stabilization gains
from commitment increasing substantially to over a 1% consumption equivalent increase,
a ﬁgure much larger than that found in most the current literature. Our ﬁnding endorses
the conclusion reached by Adam and Billi (2007), discussed in the Introduction, namely
that the lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate increases the gains from
commitment several fold.
6 Time Inconsistency and Policy Coordination in the Open
Economy
We now turn to open economy aspects of the time-inconsistency problem. Following the
seminal contribution of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), chapter 10, New Keynesian open
economy DSGE modelling, the ’New Open Economy Macroeconomics’, has been a highly
active area.25 Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ developed a non-stochastic, perfect foresight two-
country general equilibrium model with ﬁrst ﬂexible prices, and then price-rigidity. This
model formed the basis for a wave of stochastic general equilibrium models that have been
used to examine the potential gains from monetary policy coordination.26.
Optimal policy can be formulated independently by each monetary authority. However
In addition to the time-inconsistency problem there is a second classical problem ﬁrst raised
by Hamada (1976): in an open economy, rules designed for the single economy may perform
badly in a world Nash equilibrium when all countries pursue similar optimal policies. In
the open economy the optimal monetary policy requires all policymakers to cooperate,
maximizing an agreed global welfare, and to be able to commit not just with respect to
each other but collectively with respect to the private sector too. These considerations
lead to a number of possible equilibria depending on whether policymakers cooperate and
can commit to the private sector and whether they can commit with respect to each other
(i.e., can cooperate).
Consider symmetrical equilibria in the sense that all authorities can either commit or
not with respect to the private sector. In the absence of any commitment mechanism for
players all authorities must independently pursue discretionary policies (non-cooperation
with discretion (ND)). If authorities can cooperate (i.e., can commit to each other) and can
commit with respect to the private sector, then the socially optimal policy with respect
welfare costs of price and (in the model of the latter paper) wage inﬂation, not included in the Lucas
calculations, and to the estimated variances of the shocks.
25See also Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) and a recent survey by Lane (1999).
26See, for example, Benigno and Benigno (2001), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) Clarida et al. (2002), Pappa
(2004), Liu and Pappa (2005), Batini et al. (2005)
20to an agreed global objective function can be achieved (cooperation with commitment
to the private sector, CC). The remaining possible equilibria are those where (for some
reason) authorities can commit to each other but not to the private sector (cooperation
with discretion, CD) or vice versa, they can commit to the private sector but not to each
other (non-cooperation with commitment to the private sector, NC). Table 8 summarizes
these four possibilities.
These linear-quadratic dynamic game equilibria are formulated in Levine and Cur-
rie (1987a), Levine and Currie (1987b), Currie and Levine (1993), Currie et al. (1996)).
General procedures, not speciﬁc to any one model, for their calculation and software for
their computation have been developed (see Kemball-Cook et al. (1995).) In a two-bloc
model the potential gains from commitment in the absence of coordination can be quanti-
ﬁed by comparing the welfare in equilibria NC and ND. These ‘gains’ can be negative: as
in Levine and Currie (1987b), for an ad hoc ‘Old Keynesian’ model commitment without
coordination may be counterproductive. Similarly one can assess the potential gains from
coordination in the absence of commitment by comparing equilibria CD and ND and
revisit the possibility of counterproductive cooperation found by Rogoﬀ (1985).
To realize the full potential gain from monetary policy coordination between the two
blocs requires a combination of commitment and coordination; i.e., equilibrium CC and
this can be be quantiﬁed by comparing CC with the non-cooperative alternatives, NC or
ND. The ﬁrst wave of the new Keynesian open economy models that revisited this old
issue in the literature cited above suggested that these gains are not substantial compare
with the gains from stabilization. Referring to Table 8, Clarida et al. (2002) compare CD
and ND and show there exists gains from CC if and only if σ  = 1. Pappa (2004) and
Benigno and Benigno (2001) compare CC and NC. Pappa (2004) shows gains are small
and Benigno and Benigno (2001) show that CC can be sustained as an NC equilibrium by
delegation to a central bank with an appropriate loss function. Finally Currie and Levine
(1993) compare CC and ND, but using an ad hoc model and utility function.
These conclusions are based on either the earlier generation of ad hoc models and loss
functions, or on very simple micro-founded models. In the words of Canzoneri et al. (2005),
“What is yet to come” is the reassessment of these gains using empirical DSGE models
incorporating various persistence mechanisms, incomplete exchange rate pass-through,
incomplete ﬁnancial markets, ‘home bias’, a non-traded sector, wage stickiness and relaxing
the assumption of complete information, all factors that could well aﬀect both commitment
and coordination gains. In particular:
1. Persistence Mechanisms and Calvo Contracts
In order to obtain a better ﬁt with data output persistence can be incorporated by
21adding habit in consumption and/or labour supply and indexing into Calvo contracts
(see Batini et al. (2005)). As we have seen these may mean we can dispense with
the ad hoc price indexation that has come under attack in the literature.
2. The Exchange-Rate Pass-Through Mechanism and Incomplete Markets
Devereux and Engel (2002) in their solution to the ‘exchange rate disconnect’ puzzle
propose three key elements of the solution: the possibility of local currency pricing
(LCP); heterogeneity in the way exported goods are priced i.e. some involve LCP,
whereas others involve producer currency pricing (PCP); thirdly, incomplete markets
and ‘noise traders’ whose expectations are conditionally biased.
3. Home Bias
Households typically may have a preference for goods produced in the home country.
However Corsetti et al. (2002) shows that this is insuﬃcient in its own right to
explain why the correlation between relative consumption and the real exchange
rate is negative for many countries.
4. Traded and Non-traded Sectors
This feature which introduces the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect is stressed in Corsetti
et al. (2002), Natalucci and Ravenna (2002), Liu and Pappa (2005) and Canzoneri
et al. (2005). The latter construct a model with a non-traded sector and incomplete
asset markets. Departures from PPP occur through the existence of a distribution
sector (as in Monacelli (2003)) but there is no price-stickiness in their model . De-
spite this limitation their model with diﬀerent productivity processes in the traded
and non-traded sectors accounts for both the exchange rate disconnect puzzle and a
low degree of risk-sharing with a negative correlation between relative consumption
and the real exchange rate. These features are combined with a signiﬁcant (and
negative) transmission of a productivity increase in one country.
5. Wage Stickiness
As Erceg et al. (2000) and Blanchard and Gali (2005) argue, wage plus price sticki-
ness are necessary to avoid the implausible ‘divine coincidence’ property that stabi-
lizing inﬂation also stabilizes the output gap. Note however that divine coincidence
is also removed by other means, such as the ad hoc mark-up shocks that are typ-
ically added to the Phillips curves at the Bayesian estimation stage and by the
non-separability of money and consumption.
6. Neo-Classical Models and DSGE Models with Partial Information
In the introduction in Collard and Dellas (2006) we noted how a Neo-Classical Lu-
22cas story of miss-perceptions about monetary aggregates can be synthesized with
the NK Calvo contract. More generally, in both the estimation and the policy anal-
ysis DSGE models need to go beyond the complete information assumption. The
implementation of this remains a major challenge for future research.27
7 Conclusions
Macroeconomics research has changed profoundly since the Kydland-Prescott seminal pa-
per. In order to address the Lucas Crtique, modelling now is based on micro-foundations
treating agents as rational utility optimizers.28 Bayesian estimation has produced models
which are more data consistent than those based simply on calibration. With micro-
foundations and new LQ techniques, normative policy based on welfare analysis is now
possible. In the open economy, policy involves a ‘game’ with policymakers and private
institutions or private individuals as players. This paper has attempted to reassess the
Kydland-Prescott contribution in the light of these developments. Despite this sea-change
the relevance of the time-inconsistency problem remains. Indeed, since time-inconsistency
rests on the existence of forward-looking, rational agents, the use of micro-foundations
which introduces more forward-looking behaviour, has increased its relevance.
The gains from commitment and how to sustain them will continue to preoccupy
economists in all areas of the subject. For macroeconomists, perhaps the most fruitful area
for future research will be in the open-economy aspects where two commitment problems
arise: that between authorities such as central banks and that between these institutions
and the private sectors. What is yet to come, then, is a study of of these issues in the
context of the ‘New Open Economy Macroeconomics.’
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A Linearization about the Zero-Inﬂation Steady State
We linearize about the deterministic zero-inﬂation steady state. Output is then at its
sticky-price, imperfectly competitive natural rate and from (16) the nominal rate of interest
is given by ¯ ı = 1
β − 1. Deﬁne all lower case variables as proportional deviations from this
28baseline steady state except for rates of change which are absolute deviations.29 Then the














(ct − hCct−1) +
φ
(1 − hN)
(lt − hNlt−1) − at (A.2)










(it − Etπt+1) (A.4)




gt+1 = ρggt + ǫg,t+1 (A.6)
at+1 = ρaat + ǫa,t+1 (A.7)
Variables yt, ct, mct, at, gt are proportional deviations about the steady state. [ǫg,t,ǫa,t]
are i.i.d. disturbances. πt and it are absolute deviations about the steady state. For later
use we require the output gap the diﬀerence between output for the sticky price model
obtained above and output when prices are ﬂexible, ˆ yt say. The latter, obtained by setting
ξ = 0 in (A.1) to (A.5), is in deviation form given by30
ˆ mct = 0 =
σ
(1 − hC)
(ˆ ct − hCˆ ct−1) +
φ
(1 − hN)
(ˆ lt − hNˆ lt−1) − at (A.8)
ˆ lt = ˆ yt − at (A.9)
ˆ yt = cyˆ ct + (1 − cy)gt (A.10)
We can write this system in state space form as (29) and (30) where zt = [at,gt,lt−1,
ˆ lt−1,ct−1,ˆ ct−1,πt−1] is a vector of predetermined variables at time t and xt = [ct,πt] are
non-predetermined variables. Rational expectations are formed assuming an information
set {zs,xs}, s ≤ t, the model and the monetary rule. Table 1 provides a summary of our
notation.
B Priors and Posteriors
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the prior distributions, posterior means and medians and 90%
conﬁdence intervals for the eight model speciﬁcations. In Table 2, the medians of ξ are
obtained by using λ ≡
(1−βξ)(1−ξ)
(1+βγ)ξ ; average contract lengths 1
1−ξ (in parentheses) are
measured in quarters.
29That is, for a typical variable Xt, xt =
Xt− ¯ X




where ¯ X is the baseline steady state. For
variables expressing a rate of change over time such as it, xt = Xt − X.
30Note that the zero-inﬂation steady states of the sticky and ﬂexi-price steady states are the same.
29πt producer price inﬂation over interval [t − 1,t]
it nominal interest rate over interval [t,t + 1]
mct marginal cost
lt, ˆ lt consumption with sticky prices and ﬂexi-prices
yt, ˆ yt output with sticky prices and ﬂexi-prices
lt, ˆ lt employment with sticky prices and ﬂexi-prices
xt = yt − ˆ yt output gap
at+1 = ρaat + ǫa,t+1 AR(1) process for factor productivity shock, at
gt+1 = ρggt + ǫg,t+1 AR(1) process government spending shock, gt
β discount parameter
γ indexation parameter
hC, hN habit parameters
1 − ξ probability of a price re-optimization
σ risk-aversion parameter
φ disutility of labour supply parameter
Table 1: Summary of Notation (Variables in Deviation Form)
Parameter notation prior mean density
Price indexation parameter γ 0.7 beta
Slope of Phillip’s curve λ 0.2 gamma
Consumption habit parameter hC 0.7 beta
Labour habit parameter hN 0.7 beta
Risk-aversion parameter σ 1.5 gamma
AR(1) coef.-government spending ρg 0.7 beta
AR(1) coef.-factor productivity ρa 0.7 beta
Interest rate smoothing parameter ρi 0.8 beta
Feedback on expected inﬂation θ 1.7 gamma
Mean of inﬂation r∗ 2.0 gamma
Mean of (unobservable) real interest rate π∗ 4.0 gamma
Sd of government shock sd(ǫg) 1.7 inverse gamma
Sd of productivity shock sd(ǫa) 1.7 inverse gamma
Sd of monetary shock sd(ǫe) 1.0 inverse gamma
Table 2: Prior Distributions
30Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Parameter Post. Post. Conf. Post. Post. Conf. Post. Post. Conf. Post. Post. Conf. Post. Post. Conf. Post. Post. Conf. Post. Post. Conf. Post. Post. Conf.
mean med. inter. mean med. inter. mean med. inter. mean med. inter. mean med. inter. mean med. inter. mean med. inter. mean med. inter.
γ 0.52 0.51 (0.35 0.65 0.65 (0.48 0.53 0.53 (0.37 0.63 0.63 (0.46
0.68) 0.82) 0.68) 0.81)
λ 0.15 0.15 (0.07 0.22 0.20 (0.07 0.12 0.12 (0.06 0.18 0.17 (0.07 0.16 0.14 (0.04 0.53 0.52 (0.24 0.13 0.15 (0.03 0.40 0.38 (0.18
0.24) 0.35) 0.19) 0.26) 0.26) 0.81) 0.20) 0.61)
hC 0.85 0.86 (0.75 0.85 0.86 (0.77 0.84 0.85 (0.72 0.84 0.85 (0.73
0.96) 0.96) 0.95) 0.95)
hN 0.65 0.65 (0.49 0.66 0.67 (0.51 0.66 0.67 (0.51 0.59 0.60 (0.44
0.80) 0.82) 0.82) 0.74)
σ 0.06 0.06 (0.02 3.48 3.47 (1.70 0.10 0.10 (0.03 0.07 0.06 (0.02 3.46 3.38 (1.70 3.52 3.40 (0.79 0.12 0.13 (0.04 3.49 3.35 (1.83
0.11) 5.13) 0.15) 0.13) 5.13) 5.22) 0.18) 5.26)
ρg 0.94 0.94 (0.90 0.95 0.95 (0.92 0.94 0.94 (0.90 0.94 0.94 (0.90 0.94 0.95 (0.91 0.95 0.95 (0.92 0.94 0.95 (0.91 0.95 0.98 (0.91
0.98) 0.98) 0.98) 0.98) 0.98) 0.98) 0.98) 0.98)
ρa 0.59 0.59 (0.44 0.87 0.87 (0.81 0.52 0.53 (0.37 0.30 0.30 (0.14 0.86 0.87 (0.80 0.89 0.89 (0.83 0.25 0.24 (0.10 0.88 0.88 (0.83
0.72) 0.93) 0.67) 0.48) 0.93) 0.93) 0.37) 0.93)
ρi 0.88 0.88 (0.83 0.76 0.76 (0.68 0.85 0.85 (0.79 0.88 0.88 (0.83 0.78 0.78 (0.71 0.72 0.72 (0.63 0.85 0.86 (0.78 0.75 0.76 (0.67
0.93) 0.84) 0.91) 0.93) 0.85) 0.83) 0.91) 0.84)
θ 1.74 1.69 (1.00 2.34 2.30 (1.54 2.07 2.01 (1.36 1.88 1.81 (1.06 2.17 2.15 (1.31 2.44 2.42 (1.63 2.00 1.97 (1.27 2.42 2.36 (1.62
2.35) 3.21) 2.85) 2.62) 2.94) 3.19) 2.65) 3.15)
r∗ 1.77 1.83 (0.88 2.00 2.01 (1.35 1.83 1.85 (1.06 1.82 1.83 (0.97 1.99 1.99 (1.38 1.98 1.98 (1.32 1.85 1.82 (1.08 1.94 1.96 (1.27
2.53) 2.64) 2.60) 2.62) 2.69) 2.64) 2.67) 2.60)
π∗ 3.01 3.02 (2.42 2.81 2.82 (2.09 2.94 2.95 (2.36 3.07 3.04 (2.38 2.83 2.84 (2.08 2.73 2.72 (1.95 3.03 3.00 (2.37 2.80 2.82 (2.00
3.57) 3.50) 3.44) 3.79) 3.56) 3.57) 3.66) 3.59)
sd(ǫg) 2.58 2.56 (2.23 2.64 2.64 (2.26 3.04 3.00 (2.42 2.68 2.67 (2.29 2.65 2.64 (2.26 2.67 2.65 (2.29 3.19 3.19 (2.52 2.67 2.64 (2,30
2.93) 3.01) 3.61) 3.06) 3.00) 3.04) 3.72) 3.04)
sd(ǫa) 0.94 0.87 (0.46 1.67 1.58 (1.02 1.05 0.95 (0.53 1.05 0.94 (0.49 1.44 1.35 (0.83 1.23 1.19 (0.81 1.40 0.88 (0.57 1.07 1.03 (0.70
1.47) 2.29) 1.52) 1.62) 2.21) 1.65) 3.39) 1.41)
sd(ǫe) 0.15 0.14 (0.13 0.16 0.16 (0.14 0.15 0.15 (0.13 0.15 0.15 (0.13 0.16 0.16 (0.14 0.18 0.18 (0.15 0.15 0.15 (0.13 0.18 0.18 (0.15
0.17) 0.18) 0.17) 0.18) 0.19) 0.21) 0.17) 0.21)
Med. of ξ 0.68(3.14) 0.64(2.80) 0.71(3.45) 0.61(2.54) 0.69(3.23) 0.41(1.69) 0.62(2.66) 0.46(1.87)
LL -262.992 -260.582 -263.957 -274.980 -260.844 -260.764 -269.707 -262.658
Prob. 3.15% 35.05% 1.20% 0 26.97% 29.22% 0 4.40%
Table 3: Posterior Estimates and Log Marginal Densities
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1 0.031 0 0 -0.21 -0.32 -0.44 -0.69
2 0.351 0.86 0 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.75
3 0.012 0 0.65 -2.39 -2.71 -3.04 -3.74
4 0.000 0 0 -0.21 -0.32 -0.44 -0.69
5 0.270 0.86 0.67 0.47 0.42 0.36 0.25
6 0.292 0.85 0 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.73
7 0.000 0 0.67 -2.59 -2.93 -3.28 -4.02
8 0.044 0.85 0.60 0.53 0.48 0.44 0.34
E[T∗] - - - 0.64 0.60 0.57 0.49
Table 4. The Optimal Steady State Tax Wedge.
wi σ2
i ˜ Ω0(wi) ˜ Ω0(0) π∗ ¯ Ω0(0) Ω0(0)
0 1.57 10.4 10.4 1.46 31.1 41.5
1 0.79 11.4 10.6 0.73 7.8 18.4
2 0.62 12.1 10.8 0.53 4.1 14.9
3 0.52 12.8 11.0 0.40 2.3 13.3
4 0.45 13.3 11.2 0.30 1.3 12.5
5 0.39 13.9 11.4 0.21 0.6 12.0
6 0.35 14.3 11.6 0.15 0.33 11.93
7 0.31 14.8 11.8 0.08 0.09 11.89
8 0.28 15.2 12.0 0.03 0.01 12.01
9 0.26 15.6 12.1 0.0 0.0 12.1
10 0.23 16.0 12.3 0.0 0.0 12.3
Table 5. Optimal Commitment with a Nominal Interest Rate ZLB.
Notation: π∗ = max[z0(p)σi − ( 1
β − 1) × 100,0] = max[1.96σi − 1.01,0] with p = 2.5%
probability of hitting the zero-lower bound and β = 0.99. ¯ Ω0(0) = 1
2wπ(1 − γ)2π∗2 =
14.6π∗2. Ω0(0) = ˜ Ω0(0) + ¯ Ω0(0).
32wi σ2
i ˜ Ω0(wi) ˜ Ω0(0) π∗ ¯ Ω0(0) Ω0(0) No. Iters.
0 1.11 11.0 11.0 1.06 16.4 27.4 60
1 1.73 13.9 12.4 1.57 36.0 48.4 116
2 2.60 22.5 18.9 2.15 67.5 86.4 158
3 3.80 39.2 32.1 2.81 115.3 147.4 191
4 5.41 66.7 54.3 3.55 184.0 238.3 220
5 7.53 108.1 87.6 4.37 278.8 366.4 262
6 10.3 167.0 135.8 5.28 407.0 542.8 383
7 13.8 247.3 197.6 6.27 574.0 771.6 620
8 18.1 352.5 278.8 7.33 784.4 1063 1000
9 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ non-conv
10 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ non-conv
Table 6. Optimal Discretion with a Nominal Interest Rate ZLB.
Notation: As for Table 4. ’No.Iters.’ indicates the number of iterations to achieve con-






No ZLB Constraint (0,0) 0.043 0.041
ZLB Constraint (1.06,0.08) 1.11 1.07
Table 7. Core Model: Stabilization Gains From Commitment:
% Consumption Equivalent (c
gain






Table 8: Possible Equilibria
33